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Abstract
In this paper we rst develop a theory of almost stochastic dominance for risk-
seeking investors to the rst three orders. Thereafter, we study the relationship
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for risk averters.
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1 Introduction
There are two major types of persons: risk averters and risk seekers. Markowitz (1952)
and Tobin (1958) propose the mean-variance (MV) selection rules for risk averters and
risk seekers. Stochastic Dominance (SD) is rst introduced in mathematics by Mann and
Whitney (1947) and Lehmann (1955). Quirk and Saposnik (1962), Hanoch and Levy
(1969), and many others develop the theory of SD related to economics and develop the
stochastic dominance rules for risk averters. On the other hand, Meyer (1977), Stoyan
(1983), Wong (2007), and many others develop the stochastic dominance rules for risk
seekers.
The theory of almost stochastic dominance (almost SD) developed by Leshno and Levy
(LL, 2002) plays an important role in several elds, particularly in nancial research,
and has drawn several important applications; see, for example, Levy (2006, 2009), Bali,
et al. (2009), and Levy, et al. (2010). Tzeng et al. (2013) show that the almost second-
degree almost SD introduced by Leshno and Levy (2002) does not possess the property of
expected-utility maximization. They modify the denition of the almost SD to acquire this
property. Nonetheless, Guo, et al. (2013a) have constructed some examples to show that
the almost SD denition modied by Tzeng et al. (2013) does not possess any hierarchy
property while Guo, et al. (2013) establish necessary conditions for Almost Stochastic
Dominance criteria of various orders.
2 Denitions, Notations, Motivation, and Back-
ground
Random variables, denoted by X and Y , dened on 
 = [a; b] are considered together
with their corresponding distribution functions F and G, their corresponding probability
density functions f and g, and means X and Y , respectively. The following notations
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will be used throughout this paper:
HAj (x) =
Z x
a
HAj 1(y) dy and H
D
j (x) =
Z b
x
HDj 1(y) dy ; (2.1)
where h = f or g and H = F or G. In addition, we dene
FAn (x) GAn (x) = Z b
a
FAn (x) GAn (x)dx ;FDn (x) GDn (x) = Z b
a
FDn (x) GDn (x)dx ; (2.2)
SAn (F;G) = fx 2 [a; b] : GAn (x) < FAn (x)g ; and
SDn (F;G) = fx 2 [a; b] : FDn (x) < GDn (x)g for n = 1; 2; 3:
We note that the denition of HAi can be used to develop the stochastic dominance
theory for risk averters (see, for example, Quirk and Saposnik, 1962; Hanoch and Levy,
1969), and thus, we call this type of SD ascending stochastic dominance (ASD) because
HAi is integrated in ascending order from the leftmost point of downside risk. On the
other hand, HDi can be used to develop the stochastic dominance theory for risk seekers
(see, for example, Hammond, 1974; Li and Wong, 1999), and thus, we call this type of SD
descending stochastic dominance (DSD) because HDi is integrated in descending order
from the rightmost point of upside prot. We rst dene risk-averse and risk-seeking
investors as follows:
Denition 2.1 For j = 1; 2; 3, UAj and U
D
j are sets of utility functions u such that:
UAj = fu : ( 1)iu(i)  0 ; i = 1;    ; jg ;
UDj = fu : u(i)  0 ; i = 1;    ; jg ;
where u(i) is the ith derivative of the utility function u.
We call investors the jth order risk averters if their utility functions u 2 UAj and the jth
order risk seekers if their utility functions u 2 UDj . Readers may refer to Menezes, et al.
(1980), Post and Levy (2005), Post and Versijp (2007), Fong, et al. (2008), Wong and Ma
(2008), and Crainich, et al. (2013) for more properties of the utility functions.
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Leshno and Levy (2002) comment that sometimes applying the theory of SD could
not draw preferences between two prospects, say X and Y , but most investors will prefer
one to the other. They give an example as follows:
Example 2.1 Suppose that an investor considers two mutually exclusive prospects A
and B which involve the same initial investment. Prospect A yields $900 with a probability
of 1/2 and $100,000 with a probability of 1/2. Prospect B yields $1,000 with certainty.
Leshno and Levy (2002) comment that in Example 2.1, A does not dominate B by both
MV and SD rules but they believe that almost all investors will choose A. To circumvent
the limitation of the MV and SD rules, they introduce the theory of almost SD. Leshno
and Levy (2002) and others develop the almost SD rule. We state the almost SD rule
developed by Leshno and Levy (2002) and modied by Tzeng et al. (2012) as follows:1
Denition 2.2 Given two random variables X and Y with F and G as their respective
distribution functions, for 0 <  < 1=2, X is at least as large as Y in the sense of:
1. -almost FASD or -AFASD, denoted by X almost()1A Y if and only ifZ
SA1

FA1 (x) GA1 (x)

dx  FA1 (x) GA1 (x);
2. -almost SASD or -ASASD, denoted by X almost()2A Y if and only ifZ
SA2

FA2 (x) GA2 (x)

dx  FA2 (x) GA2 (x) and X  Y ;
3. -almost TASD or -ATASD, denoted by X almost()3A Y if and only ifZ
SA3

FA3 (x) GA3 (x)

dx  FA3 (x) GA3 (x) and GAn (b)  FAn (b) for n = 2; 3
where SAn (F;G) and
FAn (x) GAn (x) for n = 1; 2; 3 are dened in (2.2), -almost FASD,
SASD, and TASD stand for -almost rst-, second-, and third-order ASD, respectively.
In Example 2.1, it is clear that most people prefer Prospect A to Prospect B. However,
all the traditional MV and SD rules for risk averters cannot be used to determine their
1We note that we have modied their notations to distinct them from the notations used for the risk
seekers.
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domination relationship. Nonetheless, the almost SD rule developed by Leshno and Levy
(2002) and Tzeng et al. (2012) could draw preference of A over B. However, though the
almost SD rule developed by Leshno and Levy (2002) and others could draw preference for
risk averters, but not risk seekers. To complete the theory of almost SD, we will develop
the almost stochastic dominance concept for risk seekers. We modify from Example 2.1
to get the following example to illustrate the motivation:
Example 2.2 Prospect A yields $1 with a probability of 1/2 and $100,000 with a prob-
ability of 1/2 and Prospect B yields $99,999 with certainty.
In Example 2.2, it is clear that most people will prefer Prospect B to Prospect A, no
matter whether they are risk averters or risk seekers. Similar to the situation that ASD
rule could not draw preference between A and B in Example 2.1, the MV rules for risk
seekers and the SD rules for risk seekers could not be used to determine their domination
relationship in Example 2.2. Readers may think that this example is not realistic. We note
that there are many real examples will draw the same preference as that from Example
2.2. One such example is to invest in the bonds issued by Lehman Brothers (LB) Holdings
Inc. before the sub-crime crisis with only one or two percent higher than T-bills. However,
investors could end up lose all their investment in the LB bonds because LB goes bankrupt.
Similar to the situation that ASD cannot be used to explain Example 2.1 and Leshno
and Levy (2002) develop almost ASD, now, DSD cannot be used to explain Example 2.2,
we develop almost DSD, the almost SD rule for risk seekers as shown in the following
denition:
Denition 2.3 Given two random variables X and Y with F and G as their respective
distribution functions, for 0 <  < 1=2, X is almost at least as large as Y and F is almost
at least as large as G in the sense of:
1. -almost FDSD or -AFDSD, denoted by X almost()1D Y or F almost()1D G; if and
only if Z
SD1

GD1 (x)  FD1 (x)

dx  FD1 (x) GD1 (x);
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2. -almost SDSD or -ASDSD, denoted by X almost()2D Y or F almost()2D G; if and
only if Z
SD2

GD2 (x)  FD2 (x)

dx  FD2 (x) GD2 (x) and X  Y ;
3. -almost TDSD or -ATDSD, denoted by X almost()3D Y or F almost()3D G; if and
only ifZ
SD3

GD3 (x)  FD3 (x)

dx  FD3 (x) GD3 (x) and GDn (a)  FDn (a) for n = 2; 3
where SDn (F;G) and
FDn (x) GDn (x) for n = 1; 2; 3 are dened in (2.2), -almost FDSD,
SDSD, and TDSD stand for almost rst-, second-, and third-order DSD, respectively.
Now let's turn back to the Example 2.2. As discussed before, B cannot dominate
A by SDSD. However, for this example, we can conclude that B almost()2D A. The SD
approach is regarded as one of the most useful tools for ranking investment prospects when
there is uncertainty, since ranking assets has been proven to be equivalent to expected-
utility maximization for the preferences of investors/decision makers with dierent types
of utility functions. It is interesting to examine whether almost SD possesses a property
of expected-utility maximization similar to SD. Before we carry on our discussion, we rst
specify dierent types of utility functions as shown in the following denition:
Denition 2.4 For n = 1; 2, and 3, we dene
UAn () =

u 2 UAn : ( 1)n+1u(n)(x)  inff( 1)n+1u(n)(x)g[1=  1] 8x
	
;
UDn () =

u 2 UDn : u(n)(x)  inffu(n)(x)g[1=  1] 8x
	
:
We call investors the jth order -risk averters if their utility functions u 2 UAn () and the
jth order -risk seekers if their utility functions u 2 UDn ().
3 The Theory
Tzeng et al. (2012) modify the almost SD rule developed by Leshno and Levy (2002)
so that the almost SD rule for risk averters possesses the property of expected-utility
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maximization. In this paper we will show that the almost SD rule for risk seekers also
possesses the property of expected-utility maximization. Here, we state both results in
the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 For n = 1; 2; and 3,2
1. X almost()nA Y if and only if E[u(X)]  E[u(Y )] for any u 2 UAn (), and
2. X almost()nD Y if and only if E[u(X)]  E[u(Y )] for any u 2 UDn ().
Now, we turn to examine whether there is any relationship between the almost ASD
rule and almost DSD rule. We rst show in the following theorem that almost ASD and
DSD could be a dual problem:
Theorem 3.2 For any random variables X and Y and for n =1,2 and 3,
X almost()nA Y if and only if   Y almost()nD  X :
We turn to show that sometimes the preference of assets by using almost ASD could
be in the same direction as that by using almost DSD but sometimes they are in the
opposite direction. We rst show in the following theorem for the rst order that they are
in the same direction:
Theorem 3.3
For any random variables X and Y ,
X almost()1A Y if and only if X almost()1D Y :
2We note that one could easily extend our work to n > 3. However, though some studies, see, for
example, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), Eeckhoudt, et al. (2009), and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010),
study risk to n > 3, most academics and practitioners are only interested in studying the case up to
n = 3. Thus, we stop at n = 3.
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Levy and Levy (2002) show that if prospects X and Y have the same nite mean,
then sometimes the preference for risk averters and risk seekers could be opposite. Could
this property hold for almost SD? We show that this is true as shown in the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.4 If X = Y , then
X almost()2A Y if and only if Y almost()2D X :
As shown later, almost ASD and DSD do not possess the hierarchy property; that is, lower
order almost ASD and DSD does not imply higher ones. Nevertheless, in this paper we
still recommend not to examine any higher order almost SD (ASD or DSD) if one nds a
lower order almost SD (ASD or DSD) relationship. For convenience purpose, we still call,
say, almost SASD to be \trivial" almost SASD if one nds there is almost FASD.
We note that in order to have a \non-trivial" second-order almost SD (either ASD or
DSD) rule for X and Y , their means must be equal (X = Y ). If their means are not
equal, applying Theorem 3.1, we will obtain rst-order almost SD rule for both ASD and
DSD. Thereafter, applying Theorem 3.3 will conclude that the preferences of X and Y
are of the same direction and there are rst order almost ASD and DSD between X and
Y , not \non-trivial" almost second-order SD.
In addition, Chan, et al. (2012) show that it is possible to have non-trivial third order
ASD and DSD between prospects X and Y such that their preferences are the same. Is
it possible for the almost SD to have a similar property? In this paper we show that this
is possible by showing the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5 If X = Y and F
A
3 (b) = G
A
3 (b), then X almost()3A Y if and only if
X almost()3D Y .
We now examine the hierarchy property. To do so, we rst discuss the following issue
for sets of the utility functions UAn () and U
D
n (). It is well-known that in Denition 2.1
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that UAj+1  UAj and UDj+1  UDj . One may wonder whether there is a similar property for
Denition 2.4 that for  > 0, we have UAj+1()  UAj () and that UDj+1()  UDj (). To
answer this question, rstly, the 's in these two sets may be dierent. Secondly, UA2 ()
only make constraints on u00, while UA1 () focus on u
0. As we know, higher order derivatives
cannot determine lower order ones. Thus, even we have  u00(x)  inff u00(x)g[1= 1] 8x,
we may still do not have u0(x)  inffu0(x)g[1=   1] 8x. We give the following example
for this illustration:
Example 3.1 consider u(x) = 2x   x2; x 2 [0; 1]. we can have u0(x) = 2   2x and
u00(x) =  2. Clearly, u 2 UA2 (), while it does not belong to UA1 () since inffu0(x)g = 0.
We note that Theorem 3.1 shows that both almost ASD and DSD rules possess the
property of expected-utility maximization. It is well-known that both ASD and DSD
possess the hierarchy property (Levy, 1992, 1998) that FASD implies SASD, which, in
turn, implies TASD and also FDSD implies SDSD, which, in turn, implies TDSD. Thus,
the lowest order of SD relationship is reported and any higher order SD relationship is
\trivial" since it can be implied by a lower order SD. For example, if we nd X FASD Y ,
then it is trivial that X SASD Y and X TASD Y . Guo, et al. (2013) nd that the almost
ASD dened in Denition 2.2 does not possess the hierarchy property such that almost
FASD does not imply almost SASD, which also does not imply almost TASD. Similarly,
one could easily show that the almost DSD dened in Denition 2.3 does not possess the
hierarchy property such that almost FDSD does not imply almost SDSD, which also does
not imply almost TDSD. To illustrate the non-hierarchy of almost DSD, we give a simple
example to show that almost FDSD does not imply almost SDSD:
Example 3.2 Prospect A yields $1 with a probability of 1/2 and $5 with a probability
of 1/2 and Prospect B yields $3.33 with certainty. It's easy to know that Prospect B
dominates A by almost FDSD. Denote the distributions of A and B be G(x) and F (x)
respectively. Note that FD2 (x) GD2 (x) = 0:83 0:5x, if 1  x  3:33; while if 3:33 < x  5,
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FD2 (x) GD2 (x) = 0:5(x  5). Then according to the Denition 2.3, we can conclude that
Prospect B does not dominate A by almost SDSD.
4 Illustrations
In this section we will construct some examples to illustrate the theory we have developed
in Section 3. We note that all of the examples constructed in this paper could be used
to illustrate Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and thus, we do not discuss the illustration for the
assertions in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
To illustrate the assertion in Theorem 3.3, we rst consider Example 2.1. In this
example, since minFA(x) = 900 < minFB(x) = 1000, from the necessary condition of
stochastic dominance for risk averters, one could easily check that A does not dominate
B by stochastic dominance for risk averters of any order. However, one could easily nd
that both A almost()1A B and A almost()1D B hold at the same time and thus illustrate
the assertion in Theorem 3.3. In addition, Example 2.2 can also be used to illustrate the
assertion in Theorem 3.3. Some simple computation can lead to conclude both B almost()1A
A and B almost()1D A. The result implies that both rst order -risk averters with utility
u 2 UA1 () and rst order -risk seekers with utility u 2 UD1 () will prefer A to B in
Example 2.1 and prefer B to A in Example 2.2.
To illustrate the assertion in Theorem 3.4, we use the following example introduced
by Levy (2006):
Example 4.1 Now, Prospect A yields $1.49 and $3.51 with equal probabilities of 1/2.
Prospect B yields $1,2,3 and $4 with equal probabilities of 1/4.
Levy shows in this example that there is neither FASD nor SASD between A and B.
One could also easily verify that there is no FDSD nor SDSD between A and B. Thus,
investors with u 2 UAi or UDi ; i = 1; 2 will be indierent from A and B. Nonetheless, we
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observe from this example that A dominates B by -almost SASD while B dominates A
by -almost SDSD. Thus, second order -risk averters with utility u 2 UA2 () will prefer
A to B while second order -risk seekers with utility u 2 UD2 () will prefer B to A.
Now we turn to illustrate the assertion in Theorem 3.5 by using the following example:
Example 4.2 Consider
F (x) =
x+ 1
2
;  1  x  1 and G(x) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
0  1  x   3=4;
x+ 3
4
 3=4  x   1=4;
1
2
 1=4  x  0;
x+ 1
2
0  x  1=4;
3
4
1=4  x  3=4;
x 3=4  x  1:
Notice that both distributions have the same zero mean and FA3 (b) = G
A
3 (b) = 2=3.
Since minF (x) =  1 < minG(x) =  3=4, F does not dominate G by traditional rst-order
SD for risk averters. Since F = G = 0, G does not dominate F by rst-order SD for
risk seeker either. Moreover, for x 2 [ 1; 0]; G(2)(x)  F (2)(x), and x 2 [0; 1]; G(2)(x) 
F (2)(x), G does not dominate F by SASD and F does not dominate G by SDSD. Further,
we can know that F does not dominate G by -almost FASD nor -almost SASD since
the statement
R
SAn

FAn (x) GAn (x)

dx = 1=2
FAn (x) GAn (x) holds for n = 1; 2 . From
Theorem 3.2, we can show that G does not dominate F by -almost FDSD nor -almost
SDSD either. However, for these two prospects, one could easily show that G dominates
F by -almost TASD and -almost TDSD, which illustrates Theorem 3.5. We note that
in this example, G dominates F by both TASD and TDSD.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we rst develop a theory of almost stochastic dominance for risk-seeking
investors to the rst three orders. Thereafter, we study the relationship between the
preferences of almost stochastic dominance for risk-seekers with that for risk averters.
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